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supposed to be: one that could carry large payloads over great distances. As the F-111A, it didn't work out that way. So what the Air Force has been ordered to do is to take the F-111A as it comes off the line today, and add the extra gear needed even to approach adequate performance.

Ironically, the ad-on equipment is that already going onto the Navy's F-111B for carrier operation. Specifically, the FB-111 will have a beefed-up landing gear identical to (or at least virtually the same as) the Navy's. And it will have the Navy's special wing-tip extensions—necessary to give it greater "lift" surface for carrier landings and take-offs—to get the FB-111 off the ground. These and other additions will push the weight of the 90,000-pound F-111A up to an estimated 129,000 on the converted FB-111.

#### FLIGHTS OF FANCY

The laws of aerodynamics, however, do not yield easily to such flights of computer fancy. In short, what all this does to the plane's performance is give it a negative single-engine rate of climb. Translated, the FB-111, which like every TFX is a twin-engine affair, will be so heavy that if one engine conks out, the other won't be enough to keep it from crashing.

Finally, since the plane can't protect itself as a fighter should, it will need to be accompanied on a long-range strike mission not only by a fleet of tankers but also by an escort of fighter planes. Aside from the lack of "surprise" this flying armada would impart to SAC's traditional way of carrying out its missions, the plane's vulnerability to defenders would be multiplied many times. And Mr. McNamara's dream—one all-purpose plane, at great savings, or indeed at any cost—becomes, for American pilots of the seventies, literally a nightmare.

#### DANGERS SEEN

Even the top brass at the Pentagon recognize the dangers. They have referred continually to the FB-111 as an "interim" replacement for the B-58s and B-52s. However, Mr. McNamara, in testimony before Congress earlier this year, refused to accept their characterization. The FB-111, he held, will be not only a "successful" plane but a "permanent one" as well.

Ironically, not long afterward, Dr. John Foster, Research Director in the Pentagon, proposed an "improved" version of the FB-111 superplane to SAC. (Guesses were that it required development of more powerful engines.) "The move is seen as an effort to bring (its) capabilities . . . closer to those of the advanced manned strategic aircraft which the Air Force seeks," commented the knowledgeable, and sometimes wry, Aviation Week. SAC, noting that such a development could not possibly bear fruit until years after the B-52s are phased out—and that even its next-generation AMSA could be available sooner—turned it down. But the idea said a great deal about the integrity of the Secretary of Defense.

Activities elsewhere in the Pentagon, finally, speak volumes on the subject. The U.S. is at war. Last week's accelerated attrition of American fighter and bomber aircraft pointed up anew the striking fact that the nation is unprepared, and destined to remain so for some time to come; urgent new orders for McDonnell's F-4, Ling-Temco-Vought's A-7, even Northrop's F-5A, have been placed, or soon will be. Meanwhile, the Tactical Air Command, as Gen. G. B. Disoway testified before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee last month, is "down to bedrock."

#### YEARS AWAY

Its new fighter, the F-111A, should have been in combat by now; so, too should the carrier forces' F-111B (or some alternative). Instead, both remain years away from operational use, if indeed they ever do get into the

fight; even then, they won't be as good as they might have been. The Navy is so pessimistic that, besides cutting TFX procurement to the bone (postponing it two years more), seriously is considering a swing-wing model of McDonnell's excellent little F-4, a plane which in its present design costs only \$2 million, weighs half as much as the F-111B, and has proven to be our best fighter against the MIG-21 in Vietnam.

According to staff members, the Preparedness Subcommittee, headed by Senator JOHN STENNIS (D., Miss.), is waiting only until the 90th Congress has been safely elected and duly installed to probe fully this disaster in U.S. preparedness. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator JOHN MCCLELLAN (D., Ark.)—which brought most of the murky background of the TFX to the surface in an abortive investigation three years ago—likewise is known to be waiting, in a gesture to President Johnson (as well as to MCCLELLAN's own re-election campaign), until the first of the year to resume, at last, its own study of how so expensive and high-flown a development could have happened—and come to naught. And the House Armed Services Committee, under Rep. L. MENDEL RIVERS (D., S.C.), along with Senator RUSSELL's aforementioned counterpart in the upper chamber, already has delved deeply into the F-111 scandal. Throughout Congress, indeed, the powers-that-be are said to be chafing over the reliance on the man who has held the job of Secretary of Defense longer—and perhaps with more disastrous results—than any other in history.

#### THE CAMBODIAN CAPER

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, a group calling itself Americans Want To Know has recently returned from a conducted tour of the Cambodian side of its eastern border areas and announced to an unsurprised world that its members found no Vietcong in Cambodia. I say unsurprised because it was hardly to be expected that any such evidence would be found since others have had the same tour with the same results. Certainly, the group well knew this before it started out. It is doubtful, in view of the group's composition, that they would have journeyed so far had there been any real question as to the outcome. It is just as doubtful that the same group would have ever found the Ho Chi Minh trail complex, which is nonetheless very real. In view of this group's self-proclaimed objectivity I was disturbed to note that nowhere in the press dispatches could I find any indication that they had interviewed American soldiers on the other side of the border about what they knew of where the Vietcong operated. I suppose their views would be dismissed out of hand as being biased and as part of a great conspiracy to mislead the American public. I was in South Vietnam in April. Just a few miles from the Cambodian border we were told by a Special Forces officer of the existence of three airstrips on Cambodian soil receiving daily flights of supplies for the Vietcong. I have yet to talk to any knowledgeable military people who doubt that Cambodia is a source of supply and a sanctuary for the Vietcong. If it comes to the question of accepting

Cambodian diplomatic protests or the statements of our troops engaged in daily combat I will unreservedly choose the latter. If these headline-chasing Americans really wanted to know they would have asked the bullet-dodging Americans who do know.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I insert in the RECORD an editorial appearing in the Friday, August 12, Washington Evening Star, entitled "The Cambodian Capers" which puts the findings of the "Americans Want To Know" group in proper perspective:

#### THE CAMBODIAN CAPER

Seven inquisitive Americans have returned from a guided tour of Cambodia with the announcement that they could find no evidence that Viet Cong were using that country as a sanctuary and no sign of Communist supply lines.

The group's observations—or lack thereof—comes as no surprise. It would have been truly flabbergasting if they had returned to report the sighting of any identifiable Red Vietnamese.

The VC, even in its native habitat where it is known to exist in large numbers, is an elusive quarry. Our 300,000 troops have a hard time locating them when they prefer to keep out of sight. So it is hardly logical to expect the "Americans Want to Know" group, made up of one former sergeant and six civilians, to flush a covey of guerrillas during their 12 day tour of the 16,607 square mile area. Particularly when the operation is being carried out under the guidance of the Cambodian government.

There is no reason to question the motives of the group which included Floyd B. McKissick, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality, author Kay Boyle, a business man, a public relations man, a rabbi and a Quaker. It is, however, highly doubtful that America knows any more than it did before "America Wants To Know" conducted its dubious investigation.

(Mr. CAHILL was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CAHILL'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

#### DISTRICT COURT INJUNCTION AGAINST COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, I read with shock of the decision of Judge Howard F. Corcoran enjoining the Committee on Un-American Activities from holding hearings tomorrow. This decision is directed against the committee of the House. It will, as far as I am concerned, continue with these hearings. As a member of the subcommittee, I shall certainly be there. It seems to me that this is the ultimate challenge to the peoples branch of the government, to the legislative branch which represents the people of this country, and a challenge to the committee which the people of this country and the Congress of this country have repeatedly supported.

Mr. Speaker, I shall fulfill my responsibilities to the Congress and to the peo-

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peak altitude. Moreover, the highest the plane has been able to go, after well over 1,000 hours of test-flights, is some 60,000 feet, 25%-50% short of requirements.

As recently as last May, the service put the eighth of its General Dynamics F-111A models through an exhaustive series of tests, under all but total security wraps, at Eglin Air Force Base, in Florida. Memoranda circulating in the Pentagon since then have made clear to the top brass that the plane is no match for the Communist MIG-21. At speeds of Mach 2.2 it has violent compressor stalls: the engines suddenly lose power. Carrying its full complement of conventional weapons, according to one observer, "it is so difficult to maneuver that it took half the state to bank into a complete turn." In quick maneuvers, horizontally or vertically—under conditions as near to actual combat as the Eglin experts could simulate—the plane's inability to accelerate fast enough left it "virtually incapable of defending itself in a dogfight with modern enemy aircraft."

## BASIC DRAWBACK

What's more, Air Force, Navy and even NASA tests all have verified the plane's basic drawback. Simply put, the F-111A, in aerodynamic lingo, is 35 "counts" high in drag—or 35% "draggier" than it should be. Weight, of course, makes drag harder to overcome but a plane at any weight is supposed to be designed to travel at zero drag. When "dragginess" is extreme, the reason usually lies in some aspect of the configuration where an outer appurtenance, or some inner one, (in the jet chambers) interferes with air-flow and slows the aircraft, in effect, by causing either turbulence or friction.

According to authorities assigned to the TFX, the program has been shot through with drag. A major source of concern to Navy engineers, it has been shrugged off by Air Force experts, in the belief that improved engine performance will overcome the problem. "All along, they have just refused to recognize the facts," says one observer. "Yet they know that if the drag 'counts' which the tests have shown are right, they don't have the aircraft they claim." Simply put, 35% too much drag means a plan has 35% less range on the same fuel than its design calls for, and is deficient in both acceleration and maneuverability.

A Navy official adds bitterly: "Out at Wright-Patterson they were frankly flabbergasted when they 'discovered' the drag factor meant a 35% loss of range. The Navy would have stopped production right there. But this is an Air Force program. Meeting production quotas is more important than going for design perfection. They like to think such problems will work themselves out."

## SOURCES OF DRAG

Like an insubordinate rookie, however, the difficulty has refused to respond. Investigators for months have probed three areas in the design which seem the likeliest source of drag. One is internal air flow. Because of errors in the design for airframe mounting of the engine installation, the lining of stable air called "boundary layer" may be stirred up by an erratically directed jet-stream. A year ago, sensing some such difficulty (through not admitting it publicly), the Air Force ordered General Dynamics to install so-called splitter plates, to deflect the stream from the interior surface. This maneuver hasn't helped.

A second possibility, it's said, lies in the tail assembly—the part of the overall TFX contract assigned to Grumman (but designed by General Dynamics). In the twin-jet F-111, two special rear ducts must be wide open when the afterburner is on—during acceleration, takeoffs and the like—but must be closed tightly when such added thrust is not flowing. If they are open, air can enter

(in a forward direction) from the outside, acting as a brake. Here, too, countless hours of testing, redesign and computer calculations have proved unable to effect any change.

Third, and least likely, of the possibilities under scrutiny is that drag may be caused by air entering the open areas along the lateral surfaces of the fuselage—where, in order for the swing-wings to pivot, some unstreamlined divot always presents itself to the outer airstream. Voluminous wind tunnel data don't show turbulence here, but that proves nothing. However, there's no way to plug the gaps, without upsetting the delicate functioning of the wing pivots.

## ANYONE'S GUESS

What the outcome will be is anyone's guess. The Air Force, points out a critic, now is two-thirds through the "RDT&E" (research, development, test & evaluation) phase of its program. "It has 12 planes, out of the projected 18 RDT&Es," he says, "which aren't good for anything but eternal use as test-beds." The test-and-evaluation program, to date, has cost some \$1.5 billion—nearly a third more than Mr. McNamara had projected.

Of the three main TFX versions, finally, the only one yet to fly may turn out to be the biggest bomb of all. This is the FB-111, the Defense Secretary's answer to the manned-aircraft needs in the 'seventies of the nation's Strategic Air Command. For the bomber will combine the worst features of the other two models: the awkward bulkiness of the F-111B, with the sleek but still greater weight of the F-111A. In essence, it seems an effort somehow to exploit the overweight of Mr. McNamara's TFX—for "commonality" will make the FB-111, out of the same design, a plane basically identical to the others—by making it a "flying fortress." "Now that he admits the thing is a strategic bomber," a Navy man was quoted the other day, "how can he still tell us to fly it off carriers?"

## BETTER ODDS?

Secretary McNamara has warded off endless pleas from SAC for funds to begin full-scale development of a follow-on "AMSA" (advanced manned strategic aircraft). (Congress continues to appropriate the funds anyway, most recently \$22.8 million for fiscal 1967.) Instead, he has insisted on a policy aimed at eventually using only nuclear ICBMs for strategic deterrence. (While one has yet to be fired in anger, or under anything simulating an all-out attack, the Pentagon's secretariat believes the missiles offer better odds to penetrating enemy defenses than any manned bombers; however, as former Senator Goldwater, among countless others, has pointed out, the manned plane has the singular capability of being called back to its base at the last moment.) Meanwhile, SAC's present fleet of some 680 bombers—80 supersonic B-58 Hustlers (phased out of production several years ago) and the rest, B-52 Superfortresses, some a decade old—marches inexorably toward obsolescence.

Last Christmas, the Defense Secretary abruptly changed his strategy. Yes, he admitted in effect, some sort of manned bomber ought to be kept on hand at SAC bases to insure "flexible response." But the McNamara plan was a political and military bombshell. He proposed to scrap all 80 B-58s and 350 of the oldest B-52s between 1969 and 1971. Then, added to the 250 remaining and highly advanced B-52 G or H models (the latter boasting a range of 12,500 miles, and both capable of flying at roughly Mach 1) would be 210—since upped to 275—FB-111s. Instead of developing a full-fledged new bomber, said the Secretary, transformation of the TFX into a new strato-fortress would save the country yet another half-billion dollars.

Almost no one agrees, and the figures previously cited indicate why. Worse is Mr. McNamara's technical evaluation of the FB-111; as Air Force Magazine pointed out, it "should be retained for future reference." Here's the pertinent part: "It (said the Secretary) will have twice the speed of those (B-52) aircraft, approximately, with approximately the same range. It will fly faster, both at low and high altitudes, and it will have capabilities for penetrating enemy defenses far greater than the plane it replaces. It will come into operational use in 1968. All of the units authorized will be equipped and operational by 1971."

Informed Congressional reaction to this (and an accompanying announcement to abandon 150 SAC bases), was eloquently summed up by the veteran chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, RICHARD RUSSELL. Said the soft-spoken Georgian: "If he is right, we will save a few dollars. If he is in error, may a benign Providence save these United States." In the end, however, both houses of Congress—after hearing SAC officers explain that they simply had no choice—told Mr. McNamara to go ahead. The Secretary announced that RDT&E model number 18 of the F-111A program would become the first FB-111, to be test-flown early next year.

## WILL IT FLY?

Just what this incredible aircraft will look like, or what it will do when its motors are revved, remains the subject of high interest. Some idea was projected when the Air Force, several months ago, released photos of an F-111A, its stubby wings outstretched and laden with 36 conventional 750-pound "iron" bombs. Clearly, the wings can't sweep back against the fuselage, for full acceleration, with all this hardware on them. Equally important, the plane may not be able to fly without vibrations that would literally shake it apart.

Experts have doubts about a lot of other things. Says one, Secretary McNamara's glib evaluation "obviously" mixed the TFX's capabilities as a fighter with those it conceivably may have as a bomber—"without explaining which is which." With so many iron bombs hung on the wings, it plainly no longer is a fighter; hence, it can't be twice as fast as the B-52. "It will have about the same high subsonic speed," notes Air Force Magazine. As for range, the F-111A, "under the best of circumstances—that is, with nothing but two large fuel tanks slung under its wings and cruising at subsonic speeds—can be ferried 4,100 miles." With the depicted conventional bombload, leaving room only for internally stored fuel, range "couldn't exceed 2,500 miles." To go anywhere near as far as the B-52, it would have to be accompanied by a whole fleet of tankers, to provide airborne refueling. Thus an FB-111 based in the U.S. would all but nullify SAC as a means of piloted, surprise non-nuclear deterrence.

## SITTING DUCK

Finally, even when carrying fighter-weight nuclear bombs, including three SRAM air-to-ground missiles (now only in the stage of contractor selection, and falling behind schedule), the FB-111 will command a range "well below 4,000 miles if the aircraft's high speed is used in the target area, since fuel consumption climbs rapidly at supersonic speeds." If it doesn't fly as fast as it can, of course, it's a sitting duck. Almost certainly, it won't make much difference; it would be one anyway.

Critics point out how cynically Secretary McNamara, in his FB-111 brainstorm (and the manner in which it's justified), has reacted to known and potentially disastrous problems long confronting the TFX program. As noted, this is, after all, the kind of plane the original F-111A "fighter-bomber" was